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Overcoming Domestic Legal Impediments to the
Investigation and Prosecution of Human Rights Violations:
The Case of Argentina
by Fabián Raimondo*

A

Introduction

the Supreme Court has resolved these three legal issues by
directly applying provisions of the American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR) as interpreted by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and customary international
law. Finally, the conclusion will note that although the Supreme
Court’s legal findings concerning the interpretation and application of the ACHR were well reasoned, the same cannot be said
with regard to the Supreme Court’s interpretations of jus cogens
and customary international law. Be that as it may, by resolving
those three legal hurdles, the Supreme Court
has paved the way for the investigation of
the serious human rights abuses committed
during General Videla’s dictatorship and the
prosecution of those responsible.

n Argentinean court recently convicted the former
President of Argentina, General Jorge Videla, of committing a number of serious human rights violations
during his reign of terror over thirty years ago.1 The path to
his conviction was long and complex, as investigations and
prosecutions of serious human rights violations generally are.
The reason for this is the host of knotty factual and legal issues
such investigations usually raise, including whether the suspects
are still alive; whether the government in
office has the political will to support the
investigations of the violations; whether the
competent courts are able to collect evidence
of the commission of the violations and of the
guilt of the alleged perpetrators; and, whether
statutory limitations or amnesty laws are in
force that would prevent the investigation and
prosecution of the violations.

Background Information
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In March 1976, the Argentinean military,
led by General Videla, overthrew the government presided over by Isabel Martínez de
This article will briefly describe, explain,
Perón. General Videla’s dictatorship lasted
and analyze the three most important legal
until December 10, 1983, when the demoissues complicating the possible investigacratically elected President Raúl Alfonsín
tion and prosecution of human rights violatook office. Alfonsín immediately faced
tions committed in Argentina during General
the challenge of setting out the appropriVidela’s military dictatorship, as well as how
ate mechanisms to investigate the fate of
the Argentinean Supreme Court of Justice
the desaparecidos (individuals who were
(Supreme Court) has resolved these issues.
forcefully disappeared during the dictaThe first issue is whether the human rights
torship). To this end, Alfonsín created the
violations committed during the dictatorNational Commission on the Disappeared
ship were subject to statutory limitations.
General Jorge Videla during his trial in
five
days after his inauguration as president.
Second, whether the so-called “Amnesty
Argentina.
As a commission of inquiry, Alfonsín charged
Laws” enacted by the Congress of Argentina
the National Commission on the Disappeared with the task of
could be lawfully nullified with retroactive effect. Third, whether
receiving statements concerning crimes committed and transthe presidential pardons in favor of those involved in political
mitting them to the courts having jurisdiction over the events.
violence could be lawfully nullified with retroactive effect.
However, the Commission did not have the power to determine
Many factual issues, even if critical to an overall assessment of
legal responsibility itself. In September 1984, the Commission
whether suspects are likely to be convicted, are not discussed in
published a report entitled Nunca Más (Never Again), which
this article.
documented the forced disappearance of over 9,000 people and
The first section will provide some background informarecommended the prosecution of those responsible.2
tion on the events preceding the current trials for past human
Nunca Más formed the evidentiary basis for instituting
rights violations in Argentina. The next section will show how
criminal proceedings against the nine members of the first three
military juntas. These proceedings are known worldwide as the
* Fabián Raimondo holds a Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam, and
“Juntas Trial,” which resulted in the conviction of five of the
a M.A. in International Relations and a Law Degree from the National
accused, including Videla, and the acquittal of the remaining
University of La Plata (Argentina). Currently, he serves as Assistant
four.3 However, the exemplary Juntas Trial was followed by the
Professor of Public International Law at Maastricht University and is on
enactment of two laws and two presidential decrees that led to
the List of Counsel of the International Criminal Court.
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The Supreme Court [of Argentina] has paved the
way for the investigation of the serious human rights
abuses committed during General Videla’s dictatorship
and the prosecution of those responsible.
impunity for the perpetrators and accomplices of the most serious human rights violations ever committed in Argentina.

court resolved whether the two presidential pardons granted by
Menem could be lawfully nullified with retroactive effect. The
Supreme Court resolved these issues by directly applying provisions of the ACHR as interpreted by the IACtHR and customary
international law.

In December 1986, the Argentine Congress passed Law No.
23.492 (Ley de Punto Final) and in June 1987, it passed Law
No. 23.521 (Ley de Obediencia Debida).4 The first of the two
laws foreclosed the possibility of penal action against military
and security officials who participated in operations to “repress
terrorism” following Videla’s coup d’état.5 The second of the
two laws stipulated the non-rebuttable presumption that midand low-ranking military and security officials had committed
the crimes specified in the law only pursuant to superior orders
and therefore could not be held accountable for their actions.6
These laws effectively terminated the pending criminal proceedings instituted against such officials and rendered impossible the
launch of new investigations and prosecutions against them. In
October 1989, recently elected President Carlos Menem granted
a collective pardon to about fifty additional high-ranking military officials under prosecution for acts of “State terrorism.”7 In
December 1990, Menem granted another pardon to the members
of the military juntas convicted during the Juntas Trial.8

Statutory Limitations
Enrique Arancibia Clavel was a member of Chile’s intelligence service, Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (external
DINA), whose main task was to implement Chile’s policy of
persecution against opponents to the Pinochet regime living
in Argentina. In 2000, the Oral Tribunal on Federal Criminal
Matters convicted Arancibia Clavel of two murders and participation in a criminal organization (the external DINA) between
1974 and 1978. He appealed the judgment, asserting that he
should not have been convicted for his participation in a criminal organization because the ten-year statute of limitations for
such crimes elapsed. The State of Chile, as the other party to the
appellate proceedings, argued that the crime in question constituted a crime against humanity and that such crimes are not
subject to statutory limitations. The cassation chamber agreed
with Arancibia Clavel’s argument and reversed his conviction
for participation in a criminal organization. Chile appealed to
the Supreme Court.10

Since these laws and presidential decrees came into effect,
non-governmental organizations such as Madres de Plaza de
Mayo and the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, as well
as international organs such as the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights (IACHR), have pushed for Argentina to adopt
a new legal framework to facilitate the further investigation of
crimes committed and the prosecution of those responsible.
Such a framework would include creating legislation to nullify
the Amnesty Laws and presidential pardons. In this vein, the
Argentine Congress declared the Amnesty Laws null and void
with retroactive effect in 2003. However, at the time, it was
unclear what the Supreme Court would decide regarding the
constitutionality of this controversial legislation.9 In essence, in
order to launch investigations into human rights abuses by the
military and prosecute those responsible, three main legal issues
had to be resolved.

The Supreme Court assessed the applicability of statutory limitations to the crime at stake in accordance with the
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (Statutory
Limitations Convention), to which Argentina had been a party
since 2003, and which also had recently been incorporated into
the Constitution of Argentina.11 In order to determine whether
the crime in question amounted to a crime against humanity,
the Supreme Court evaluated the relevant facts in light of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention). It found that the facts corresponded exactly to the conduct described in Article 25(3)(d) of
the ICC Statute pertaining to individual criminal responsibility,
Articles 2 and 3(b) of the Genocide Convention, and Article
2 of the Statutory Limitations Convention.12 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court found that because war crimes and crimes
against humanity are jus cogens norms of international law,
statutory limitations do not apply, even before the adoption of
the Statutory Limitations Convention in 1968.13 Given that the
crime in question amounted to a crime against humanity and that

Three Major Legal Issues
The Supreme Court resolved the three major legal hurdles
to prosecutions in three successive cases. In 2004, in Arancibia
Clavel, the court resolved whether the human rights violations
committed during the military dictatorship were subject to
statutory limitations. In 2005, in Simón and others, the court
resolved whether the Amnesty Laws could be lawfully nullified with retroactive effect. In 2007, in Mazzeo and others, the
16

By declaring the unconstitutionality of the Amnesty
Laws, the Supreme Court [enabled] Simón and others
responsible for criminal conduct [to be] convicted and
sentenced for their egregious crimes.
crimes against humanity.18 This is not strong evidence of the
existence of a relevant rule of customary international law at the
time of the original crimes. One indication that this principle
was not part of customary international law before the adoption
of the Statutory Limitations Convention, is that the preamble
used the word “affirmed” rather than “reaffirmed.”19

crimes against humanity were not subject to statutory limitations under customary international law at the relevant time, the
court held that the period of limitation set in the Penal Code of
Argentina should not have been applied.14
The Arancibia Clavel decision had several practical legal
effects. The Supreme Court held that no statutory limitations
would apply to the human rights abuses committed by the military between 1976 and 1983. This holding, while significant,
contained unconvincing legal reasoning. First, it is worth noting
that crimes against humanity were not criminalized as such in
the Penal Code of Argentina at the relevant time. As a result,
a murder that amounted to a crime against humanity under
international law would have been an “ordinary” crime subject
to statutory limitations under Argentinean law. Hence, it made
perfect sense for the Supreme Court to assess whether the crime
matched conduct that amounted to a crime against humanity
under international law.

Despite these legal obstacles, by declaring the non-applicability of statutory limitations to crimes against humanity
committed in the 1970s, the Supreme Court overcame the first
important legal impediment to the investigation and prosecution
of the human rights violations committed in Argentina during
those years. The following year, the Supreme Court considered
the next legal impediment to such investigation and prosecution,
the Amnesty Laws.

Amnesty Laws
The second legal hurdle consisted of determining whether
the Amnesty Laws could be constitutionally nullified with
retroactive effect. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in
the Simón and others case.20 Julio Simón was a member of the
Argentinean Federal Police and had been charged with kidnapping, torture, and forced disappearance of persons. In 2001,
the Federal Court for Criminal and Correctional Matters No.
4 declared the Amnesty Laws unconstitutional because they
violated the ACHR, Article 29 of the Constitution of Argentina,
and a number of other human rights treaties to which Argentina
was party.21After successive appeals the issue came before the
Supreme Court.

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s finding that crimes against
humanity were not subject to statutory limitations in the 1970s
was also based on questionable legal grounds. The Supreme
Court did not demonstrate the existence of a general practice
accepted as law, nor did it refer to any ruling of an international
court or to the opinion of learned scholars regarding statutory limitations.17 Instead, the Supreme Court based its finding on language in the preamble to the Statutory Limitations
Convention, in which State parties “affirmed” the existence of
the principle of the non-applicability of statutory limitations to
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However, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has established that to determine whether
conduct amounts to a crime under domestic law or international law, both elements of the crime — the objective element
(actus reus) and the subjective element (mens rea) — must be
assessed.15 The Supreme Court failed to determine whether both
elements of the crime corresponded with a crime against humanity at the relevant time. Instead, the Supreme Court only focused
on the objective element, neglecting the subjective one. The
Supreme Court also assessed the defendant’s conduct in light of
the crimes enumerated in the ICC Statute, a legally questionable
determination because this treaty was adopted more than twenty
years after the commission of the crime at issue. Considering
that the customary definition of crimes against humanity underwent substantial evolution since 1915,16 it is not immediately
apparent that the provision of the ICC Statute referred to by
the Supreme Court to assess Arancibia Clavel’s conduct corresponded with the notion of crimes against humanity under
customary international law in the 1970s.

Julio Simón reacts during his trial in Argentina.
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The Supreme Court found the Amnesty Laws unconstitutional for several reasons. First, since the adoption of the
Amnesty Laws, international human rights law developed legal
principles that prohibited states from enacting laws aimed at
avoiding the investigation of crimes against humanity and the
prosecution of the responsible people.22 By incorporating the
ACHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights into the Constitution, Argentina assumed the duty to
prosecute crimes against humanity under international law.23
Because the Amnesty Laws were designed to leave unpunished
serious human rights violations, they violated these treaties, and
the Constitution of Argentina.24 Moreover, the case law of the
IACtHR established essential guidelines for the interpretation
of the ACHR25 and the IACtHR held in Barrios Altos v. Peru
that the state parties to the ACHR should not establish internal
mechanisms that would thwart state compliance with the obligation to prosecute and investigate serious and widespread
human rights violations.26
Therefore, Argentina was
bound to abolish the Amnesty
Laws, deprive them of legal
effects, and overturn the prohibition against the retroactive
application of criminal law,
leading to the detriment of the
accused.27

eral and human rights law in particular in dealing with crimes
against humanity.33 On the other side, there are scholars who
believe that, notwithstanding the laudable aim of preventing and
punishing all crimes against humanity, the decision was regrettable because it ignored significant constitutional constraints,
like the right to freedom from retroactive punishment by an ex
post facto law.34
This decision clarified the constitutionality of the law passed
by Congress in 2003 to nullify the Amnesty Laws with retroactive effect. By declaring the unconstitutionality of the Amnesty
Laws, the Supreme Court overcame the second legal impediment
to the investigation and prosecution of the human rights violations committed in Argentina during the military dictatorship.
Accordingly, Simón and others responsible for criminal conduct
have been convicted and sentenced for their egregious crimes.35
However, in order to fully
investigate the crimes committed under General Videla’s
dictatorship and to allow the
prosecution of all the responsible, one legal impediment
still remained — the pardons
granted by President Menem.

[T]he Supreme Court [of
Argentina] used the terms
jus cogens and customary
law as synonyms and, in so
doing, it disregarded their
conceptual difference.

Presidential Pardons

The last legal impediment to the investigation and
prosecution of the human
rights abuses committed in
Argentina during the military
dictatorship were the presidential pardons granted by
President Menem in 1989 and
1990. The Supreme Court had to determine whether the presidential pardon granted by Decree 1002/89 was consistent with
Argentina’s international obligations in the Mazzeo and others
case.36

The Supreme Court’s decision in Simón and others was
not unanimous. In his dissent,
Judge Fayt pointed out several
aspects of the majority’s reasoning with which he could
not agree. First, he explained
that the Argentine Congress did not have the power to declare
unconstitutional the Amnesty Laws with retroactive effect,
because this was a power of the judicial branch.28 Second, the
application of the Inter-American Convention on the Enforced
Disappearance of Persons violated the principle of legality to
the detriment of the accused, as it was not in force at the time
of the perpetration of crimes in question.29 Third, the Statutory
Limitations Convention was not applicable because Argentina
became a party to it in 1995, and its application to Simón was
thus retroactive. Additionally, Judge Fayt asserted that in 1975
forced disappearance was not yet considered a crime against
humanity under customary international law.30 Furthermore, the
application of international treaties by Argentinean courts must
not prevent the application of the principle of legality, because
it is a constitutional principle of public law.31 Moreover, Judge
Fayt argued that the majority erred in invoking the IACtHR’s
judgment in Barrios Altos as a precedent, because the amnesty
laws examined by the IACtHR in that case consisted in selfamnesty laws, unlike the Amnesty Laws in the case against
Simón, enacted to excuse officials of the government in power
from criminal responsibility.32

According to the Supreme Court, the alleged participation
of the defendants in murders, kidnappings, torture, bodily harm,
and trespassing amounted to crimes against humanity.37 Under
the ACHR, states are obliged to investigate, prosecute, and punish individuals responsible for serious human rights breaches,38
therefore Decree 1002/89 was inconsistent with the preemptory
nature of crimes against humanity as a jus cogens norm of international law and the ACHR because it violated right of victims
to an effective remedy and the right to discover the truth about
such crimes.39 The Supreme Court held that Decree 1002/89 was
therefore unconstitutional.40
The Supreme Court’s ruling was correct to the extent that it
invoked the right provisions of the ACHR and case law of the
IACtHR. However, the Supreme Court’s legal reasoning based
on its understanding of jus cogens norms of international law
was unconvincing. From the outset, it should be noted that the
Supreme Court used the terms jus cogens and customary law
as synonyms and, in so doing, it disregarded their conceptual
difference.41 Here, it suffices to mention that (i) not all rules of
customary international law are rules of jus cogens and (ii) rules
of conventional law may amount to jus cogens. In his dissent,

The majority’s decision raised controversies not only within
the Supreme Court, but also in legal scholarship. On one side,
some scholars highlight the fact that the Supreme Court has
confirmed the important function of international law in gen18

Conclusions

Judge Fayt criticized the inconsistent use of both terms throughout the decision.42

The investigation and prosecution of the serious human
rights violations committed in Argentina during the military
dictatorship were paralyzed for approximately twenty years. The
three most significant legal impediments to their investigation
and prosecution were statutory limitations, Amnesty Laws, and
presidential pardons. The Supreme Court resolved these legal
hurdles by interpreting international law, particularly the ACHR
as interpreted by the IACtHR and, more generally, norms of jus
cogens and customary international law.

Perhaps most importantly, customary international law does
not prohibit pardons of sentences for crimes at present, let alone
in 1989 — the year in which Menem granted this pardon. In its
reasoning, the Supreme Court did not demonstrate the existence
of customary international law to that effect, a principle that
could have been demonstrated through the existence of relevant
state practice. Article 28 of the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Article 27
of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), and Article 23 of the Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL),
on pardons and commutation of sentences,
do not automatically
rule out pardons for
war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and
genocide, but rather
authorize the President
of these judicial institutions to decide a
request for pardon on
the basis of the general principles of law.
The ICC Statute does
not address the issue
of requests for pardon, which means that
it does not explicitly
rule them out. Hence,
had customary international law prohibited pardons for crimes
against humanity at the
time of the adoption of these four statutes (which were adopted
after the pardons by Menem), their drafters probably would have
inserted a provision in these instruments to that effect.

The power of the courts of Argentina to directly apply the
provisions of the ACHR is uncontroversial because this treaty
was incorporated into
the Constitution of
Argentina
(Article
75(22)) in 1994. The
Supreme Court’s holding that the courts
of Argentina ought
to apply the ACHR’s
provisions as interpreted by the IACtHR
is logical because the
ultimate
objective
of this judicial body
is the application and
the interpretation of
the ACHR (and other
human rights treaties).
This explains why
the annulment of the
Amnesty Laws and
presidential pardons
on the ground that they
were inconsistent with
the ACHR as interpreted by the IACtHR was generally uncontroversial. However,
Judge Fayt’s dissenting opinion in Simón and others pointed out
that the majority inappropriately invoked Barrios Altos because
it was not analogous to the case at stake.

[I]f the obligation to punish
international crimes is not
absolute, it does not make
sense that pardons for
crimes against humanity will
automatically violate such
obligations, as the Supreme Court
[of Argentina] suggested.

Furthermore, under customary international law, the obligation to punish international crimes does not appear to be absolute. If it was, international criminal courts and tribunals would
not, for example, be allowed to enter into plea agreements with
defendants, as this practice usually entails dropping charges of
international crimes and thus halting the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of the underlying conduct. Twenty such
agreements have been concluded before ICTY, and several
before the ICTR as well.43 Therefore, if the obligation to punish
international crimes is not absolute, it does not make sense that
pardons for crimes against humanity will automatically violate
such obligations, as the Supreme Court suggested.

The power of the Supreme Court to directly apply customary international law is also uncontroversial, as reflected by the
Supreme Court’s case law.44 Yet, the Supreme Court’s treatment
of customary international law in the three cases reviewed in this
article was not very careful, for two reasons. First, in Arancibia
Clavel and Mazzeo and others, the Supreme Court conflated the
terms jus cogens and customary international law, disregarding
their conceptual difference. Second, the Supreme Court applied
rules of customary international law of questionable legal foundation. In its decision, the Supreme Court failed to justify the
existence of a rule of customary international law whereby (i)
crimes against humanity in the 1970s were not subject to statutory limitations and (ii) pardons for crimes against humanity
are impermissible. While the application of the latter “rule” of
customary international law did not alter the outcome of the
proceedings (because this rule was applied in place of a more
specific ACHR provision), the application of the former “rule”
was crucial to the final adjudication of the case at hand.

In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision is persuasive to the
extent that it is grounded on the provisions of the ACHR and the
case law of the IACtHR, because under this legal regime there
is well-established case law prohibiting the enactment of laws
such as the Amnesty Laws. On the other hand, the legal reasoning based on alleged norms of customary international law was
unpersuasive.
19

Be that as it may, the Supreme Court’s decisions discussed
in this article have a great practical significance in Argentina.
They have paved the way for the investigation and prosecution of
all those who had benefited from the Amnesty Laws and presidential pardons. The conviction of General Videla is the best

example in this regard. Many other convictions will likely follow
over the next couple of years, given the long list of trials set to
start in 2011.45 True, justice should happen in a timely fashion;
but it is better late than not at all. HRB
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